Unfit for Jury Determination: Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury by Huttner, Constance S
Boston College Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 3 Number 3 Article 3
3-1-1979
Unfit for Jury Determination: Complex Civil
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right of
Trial by Jury
Constance S. Huttner
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Constance S. Huttner, Unfit for Jury Determination: Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh
Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C.L. Rev. 511 (1979), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/
bclr/vol20/iss3/3
NOTES
UNFIT FOR JURY DETERMINATION:
COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION AND
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY
Since its 1959 decision in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,' the Supreme
Court has steadily broadened the scope of the seventh amendment. to encom-
pass many situations excluded from the penumbra of the jury right at com-
mon law.= Ironically, this expansion occurs at a time when the federal courts
are plagued by record numbers of complicated civil suits—suits which in con-
sequence of Beacon Theatres and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court
are arguably entitled to jury trial. Although several courts have questioned the
practical wisdom of permitting jury resolution of complicated claims," most
have felt constrained to allow jury demands where complex cases have pre-
sented legal claims.'
Recently, however, four federal district courts' have stricken jury re-
quests where the complexity of the Factual issues presented, and the massive-
ness of the case as a whole, have led them to doubt a jury's competence to
render an intelligent verdict. Relying on a footnote from the Supreme Court's
decision in Ross v. Bernhard," which, interestingly, expanded the scope of the
jury right, these courts have reasoned that a jury's probable inability to arrive
359 U.S. 500 (I 959).
E.g., Ross Y. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970): Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres. Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
The Supreme Court has held there is no constitutional right. to a non -jury
trial. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963). See also Hurwitz v.
Hurwitz, 136 F.2(1 796, 798-99 (1943). There is therefore no constitutional barrier to
expanding the scope of the jury trial right beyond its common law boundaries. See•
generally 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 38.11[41, at 115-17 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as MooRE's].
" The functional desirability of jury trial has been the subject of intense de-
bate for nearly six centuries, with no apparent consensus having been reached. See T.
PLucai.Nrcr, A CoNcasv. lits -roxY oe THE COMMON LAW 160 (5th ed. 1956). A more
recent criticism is contained in J. FRANK, COURTS OS TRIAL (1949).
See cases cited in note 45 infra.
The four cases striking jury trial demands in complex cases are: ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise
Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). The fOotnote and accompanying text stated:
The 'Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to
he tried rather than the character of the overall action.'"
10. As our cases indicate, the "legal'' nature of an issue is determined by
considering, first., the premerger custom with reference to such questions;
second, the remedy sought: and third, the practical abilities and limitations
of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive and possibly
abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously' the most difficult to apply.
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at a rational decision operated to except the cases involved from the normal
operation of the seventh amendment. The precedent established by these
courts presents a tempting model to trial court judges wishing to avoid the
irksome task of supervising jury trials in protracted civil suits, and therefore
threatens to carve out a "complexity exception" from the seventh amend-
ment's jury trial guarantee.
This note will address the issues and problems raised by the spectre of a
complexity exception to the seventh amendment's jury trial guarantee. After
an introductory discussion of the historical and constitutional background
against which the propriety of denying jury trials in complex cases must be
considered, the reasoning of those courts which have stricken jury demands in
complex cases will he set out in detail. An effort will then be made to assess
the constitutionality of these decisions in light of the material set out in the
introductory portion of the article. Finally, this note will suggest that effective
judicial management. of complex litigation, rather than a curtailment of the
jury right, is the practical and constitutionally mandated solution to the prob-
lems created by protracted civil litigation.
I. BACKGROUND MATERIAL: RESOLVING
THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT QUESTION
The seventh amendment provides: "In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved ...... . The phrase "common law," as employed by the framers
of the amendment., was intended to embrace "not merely suits which the
common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction
to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies
were administered."' Traditionally, resolution of the seventh amendment
question has involved recourse to historical inquiry—if the nearest common
law equivalent form of action was triable to a jury in 1791,• then so too is its
modern day analogue.'" In the typical case, this sort of historical analysis
7 U.S. CONS'''. amend. VII.
8
 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 432, 446 (I830) (emphasis added). The
distinction between legal and equitable claims is preserved by rule 38(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury as declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution ... shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate. - FED. R. Cw. P. 38(a).
The characterization of a particular claim as legal or equitable is thus central to
the determination of whether there is a constitutional right to jury trial in any civil
action.
" The seventh amendment was adopted in 1791. See 5 MooRE's, supra non_! 2
¶ 38.08 [5], at 73.
The Supreme Court has phrased the historical test as follows:
In order to ascertain the scope and meaning of the Seventh Amendment,
resort nuns[ be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established
at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935). Applying this test, the Supreme Court has
determined, for example, that suits for treble damages under the antitrust laws are
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presents little difficulty." However, the dramatic post-war expansion of fed-
eral statutory law" and the procedural changes worked by the merger of law
and equity under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" have spawned a va-
riety of legal actions possessing no clear common law counterpart. In these
cases, application of the historical test has proved a tedious and occasionally
arbitrary task involving relatively esoteric inquiry into the pre-merger prac-
tices of the chancery courts."
In consequence of the difficulties inherent in applying the historical test
to novel, modern-day forms of action, the Supreme Court. has steadily mod-
ified the standard for determining the existence of a constitutional right to
jury trial. In a series of cases commencing with Beacon Theatres,' the Court
has indicated that the right of trial by jury is not solely dependent upon the
historical characterization of an action as legal or equitable. These decisions
recognize that there is a strong federal policy favoring trial by jury" which
may in itself provide the answer to the seventh amendment question where
historical analogy proves unenlightening.
entitled to jury trial, even though antitrust claims were unheard of at common law.
Fleionan v. Welsbach Co., 240 U.S. 27 passim (1916). For an interesting critique and
defense of the historical test, see James, Right 10 a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE
L.j. 655 (1963).
 -
" Professors Wright and Xliller have opined that "the number of cases pre-
senting a really doubtful question of jury right is very small. In many cases jury trial
will not be demanded. If it is demanded, in most instances it will be obvious that there
is or is not a right. to trial by jury." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 9 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE. § 2302, at 17 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
12 The Declaratory _judgment. Act., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 0970, enacted in
1934. is an excellent example of a congressionally created remedy. Jury trial is avail-
able under the Act in cases where legal issues are involved. 28 U.S.C. 2201; see 5
MooRE's,.slipro note 2,	 38.29, at 214.5.
Generally. in creating a new right of action, Congress may specify the mode of
trial subject only to the limitations imposed on its power by the seventh amendment.
Thus, Congress may extend the right to jury trial by statute to include suits formerly
heard in equity. 5 Moottifs, supra note 2.11 38.08151, at 82. The seventh amendment,
however, prohibits Congress from enlarging the scope of equity or admiralty jurisdic-
tion, if the enlargement is to he accomplished at the expense of actions entitled to jury
trial at common law. hi. See also Chief- Justice Taney's opinion in The Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 400 (1851); note 2 supra.
1 " The federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1938. effected a merger of
the law and equity courts. Thus, since the advent of the Federal Rules, there are no
longer actions at law and suits in equity, but only civil actions. See Beaunit Stills, Inc. v.
Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2,1 563, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1942). The sole remaining
distinction between law and equity is the right to jury trial in non-equitable actions.
14 In Damsky v. Zayatt, 289 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1901), judge Friendly
apologized that historical analysis "may seem to reek unduly of the study." Judge
Clark, dissenting, responded that "the result [reached by the majority] seems to he one
of logistic bootstrap lifting: it justifies my brother's apology that their discussion 'may
scent to reek unduly of the study,' or, I would add, 'if not of the DIUSCLIM2 Id. at 59.
" 359 U.S. WO (1959). Professor Redish has characterized Beacon Theatres and
its progeny as representing "a rational decision-making approach - to interpretation of
the seventh amendment. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to July Trial; A Study in the
Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. L. REV. 480, 487 (1975).
Hi See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963), observing that "[t]he federal
policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength.''
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In Beacon Theatres, the plaintiff, Fox West Coast Theatres, sought a de-
claratory judgment that certain of its business practices were not violative of
the antitrust laws." The complaint also requested that defendant Beacon
Theatres be enjoined from threatening to file suit under the Sherman Act.' 8
Beacon Theatres counterclaimed for treble damages, alleging that Fox's busi-
ness practices were in fact violative of the antitrust laws; Beacon Theatres
subsequently demanded a jury. trial on its counterclaim. The district court,
viewing the issues raised by the complaint as primarily equitable," ordered
that they be tried first to the court. Beacon Theatres' counterclaim was re-
served for later trial to a jury. 2 " On appeal, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that courts sitting in equity
had authority to dispose of legal claims arising in the context of an action for
equitable relief.' The Supreme Court reversed. holding that the defendant.
had a constitutional right to jury trial on its counterclaim, and that the order
of trial must he arranged so as to preserve that right. 22
justice Black, writing For the majority in Beacon Theatres, acknowledged
that strict historical analysis would dictate a denial of the defendant's jury
demand.'" Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that the justification for this
practice at common law was the lack of alternative procedures to insure the
equity plaintiff of an orderly disposition of his claims. Thus, to the extent that.
procedural reforms since 1938 have provided alternative means of achieving
this end, the Court held that the order of' trial must be arranged to assure
jury resolution of all legal claims. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted
that equitable relief was traditionally limited to situations where the legal rem-
17 359 U.S. at 501-04.
' 8 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976).
359 U.S. at 503.
IS. The effect of arranging the order of trial in this manner was to preclude
jury trial of Beacon Theatres' counterclaim if the court initially chose to grant Fox's
request for a declaratory judgment. Since the factual issues underlying Beacon
Theatres' treble damage claim and Fox's demand for a declaratory judgment were
identical, Beacon Theatres argued that its claim must be tried first to a jury. Id.
21
 252 F.2d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1958).
' 359 U.S. at 508.
2" Id. at 506. Historically, the relief' sought by Fox was essentialy equitable. At
common law, although the declaratory judgment procedure did not exist, a party an-
ticipating suit and unable to force the prospective plaintiff to initiate the action could
seek an injunction in equity against the potential suit at law. The equity court, once
having obtained jurisdiction in this manner, was free to resolve all issues raised in the
case, whether or not legal issues were involved. Thus, the historical approach would
have granted the trial judge in Beacon Theatres discretion to order Beacon Theatres'
counterclaim tried by jury, or to order all issues tried to the court for convenience. See
Redish, supra note 15. at 492-93.
In the wake of Beacon Theatres, the trial court's discretion is severely limited. Now,
the order of trial must be arranged so as to preserve the right to jury trial on the legal
issues; the power to order all issues tried in equity is altogether eliminated. Beacon
Theatres therefore represents a "striking departure" from historical practice. See
McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study ff Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1967).
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edy was "inadequate.' Because procedure is not static, however, the Court.
asserted that the adequacy of the legal remedy must be assessed "in light of
the remedies now made available by the Declaratory judgement Act and the
Federal Rules," 25
 rather than on the basis of "precedent, decided under dis-
carded procedures." 2" The Court's holding in Beacon Theatres thus established
that courts sitting in equity may properly assert jurisdiction only where the
legal remedy is inadequate in light of contemporary procedure, notwithstand-
ing the existence of equity jurisdiction prior to merger. The case therefore
stands for the proposition that the availability of jury trial is not. only a prod-
uct of historical practice, but is also a function of the procedural realities of
the post-merger federal courts. 27
The Court continued to move away front strict reliance on historical
analogy and towards an expanded view of the seventh amendment in Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood," decided three years after Beacon Theatres. Dairy Queen
dealt primarily with the continuing vitality of the "clean-up doctrine," a juris-
dictional doctrine which permitted courts sitting as courts of equity to resolve
any legal issues arising incidentally to the main, equitable action:2" The Court in
Dairy Queen repudiated this practice, relying on its decision in Beacon Theatres
for the proposition that the right to jury trial must be determined with regard
24 The "adequacy- of the legal remedy at common law was dependent not only
on whether a particular claim was cognizable in the law courts, but also on whether the
remedy obtainable at law was as "practical and efficient" to the ends of justice and its
prompt administration as the remedy available in equity. Thus, although his claim was
recognized by the law courts, a plaintiff might proceed in equity if the equitable rem-
edy was faster or less cumbersome than the legal remedy. On the other hand, if the
legal remedy was "plain, adequate and complete," the plaintiff was required to proceed
at law. Lewis v. Cocks, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 466, 470 (1874) (quoting Boyce v. Grundy,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 215 (1830)).
25
 359 U.S. at 507 (footnote omitted).
2" Id. With reference to the facts of Beaeon Theatres, if the action had been
brought prior to merger, the inadequacy of the legal remedy would have stemmed
both from Fox's inability to force Beacon Theatres to file suit at law, and the law
court's inability to grant injunctive relief.
" Professor McCoid has commented that "ftlhe Beacon Court's principle is
directed exactly to those cases where equity jurisdiction was founded on procedural
inadequacies at law: where the remedy at law is adequate in light of contemporary
procedure, equity lacks jurisdiction, though such jurisdiction might have existed under
earlier and different procedure." McCoid, supra. note 23, at 12-13.
" 369 U.S. 469 (1962). Daily Queen involved a claim for breach of contract and
trademark infringement. Defendants had been licensed by contract to employ the
Dairy Queen trademark and refused to discontinue its use after plaintiff, alleging
breach of contract, ordered them to desist. Plaintiff sought both an injunction against
defendant's continued use of the Dairy Queen trademark, and money damages for the
unauthorized use of its name. In its complaint, plaintiff styled its demand for a money
judgment as a claim for an "accounting" for sums due it for the-past unauthorized
use of the Dairy Queen trademark. Since "accounting" actions were traditionally re-
garded as equitable actions, the district court held that the claim for money damages
was "incidental" to the equitable relief sought, and ordered all claims tried without a
jury. McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 686, 4187-88 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
2"
 An excellent discussion of the clean-up doctrine, its purpose, and its con-
tinuing vitality, appears in Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the jury: A Suggested Orienta-
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to the procedural exigencies of modern federal practice." Applying the
Beacon Theatres principle to the facts of Dairy Queen, the Court observed that
the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules and the merged federal
judiciary had eliminated the need for clean-up jurisdiction as an equitable
doctrine."' Since the justification underlying the doctrine had vanished, the
Court reasoned that there was no logical justification for adhering to the prac-
tices of the common law chancery courts." 2
The Dairy Queen Court similarly rejected the argument that the charac-
terization of the complaint as one for an accounting—an action traditionally
regarded as a suit in equity—operated to deprive the defendant of its right to
jury trial." The Court noted that equity's jurisdicton over accounting actions
was traditionally dependent. on a finding that the accounts were so compli-
cated that only a court of equity could unravel them. In light of the provisions
of rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizing the ap-
pointment. of a special master to assist the jury, the Court. concluded that the
burden of establishing the requisite degree of complexity was "considerably
increased" "4
 under modern federal procedure, and that it would "indeed be a
rare case- 35
 in which this burden could be met.
Any remaining doubts about the exclusivity of the historical test as a
means of resolving the jury trial question were eliminated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Ross v. Bernhard.' In Ross, the Court departed from clear
historical precedent. and held that trial by jury is available in shareholder de-
rivative suits whenever the underlying cause of action is such that the corpo-
ration would have been entitled to a jury trial had it sued on its own be-
half. 37
 The Court reasoned that although shareholder derivative actions were
lion, 100 U. PA. I.. REV, 320 (1951). Professor Levin ascribes the origins of' the clean-up
doctrine to the procedural hardships created by the separate systems of law and
equity. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules, if' a party initiated an action in
equity, the equity court's refusal to pass upon incidental legal issues would have forced
the equity plaintiff to initiate a second separate action at law. Such a bifurcated proce-
dure entailed considerable time and effort and frequently resulted in incomplete relief
for the equity plaintiff due to the running of the applicable statute of limitations. Id.
See also Relish, s-upm note 15, at 498.
"" See text at note 27 supra.
3 ' FED, R. Civ. P. 18(a), (b). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (b).
32
 The essence of the Dairy Queen and Beacon •Theatres decisions is that the
seventh amendment protects substance rather than fOrni. In this regard, the two deci-
sions evidence a flexible approach to constitutional interpretation, See McCoid, supra
note 23. at 11. observing that the Beacon Theatres decision "fits well with the conception
of the Constitution as a durable document providing continuingly useful standards f in-
an evolving society. -
 However, to the extent that this flexible approach might be
employed to reduce the scope of the common law tight to jury trial, it would seem
clearly at odds with the dictates of the seventh amendment.
"3 369 U.S. at 477-78.
i" hi. at 978. See also Broderick v. American Gen. Corp., 71 F.2d 864, 867
(decided prior to Dairy Queen, but teaching the sante conclusion).
369 U.S. at 478.
396 U.S. 531 (1970). See note 6 ,thprw,
'T Id. at 537-39, The Court observed that the right to ittry trial is a function of
"the nature of the issue to he tried, rather than the character of the overall action.'' Id.
at 538. Thus, the derivative form of the shareholders' suit was held tot to be control-
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traditionally cognizable only in equity, the availability of jury trial was not
foreclosed under modern federal practice." The Ross case, in conjunction
with its predecessors, therefore embodies the principle that equity may prop-
erly act only where the legal remedy is inadequate in light of contemporary
procedure. Thus, to the extent that. procedural reforms since 1938 have made
it possible for a party to obtain adequate relief at law, equity is deprived of
jurisdiction, even though such jurisdiction may have existed at common
law." In such cases, there is a right to trial by jury, notwithstanding the
absence of this right prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules.
II. DEFINING THE INQUIRY: THE PROBLEM AND ITS ANALYSIS
In the aftermath of Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen and Ross, the relevant
inquiry with respect to the seventh amendment is not whether, prior to
merger, the claims presented would have been decided by a court of equity,
but whether the issues comprising the action could have been tried at law. 4 "
This inquiry, in turn, necessitates a determination of which issues are legal
issues, itself a task of considerable difficulty.' Recognizing the difficulty in-
herent in identifying "legal" issues, the Ross Court, in a footnote to the major-
ity decision, delineated three factors to be considered in determining the
"legal" nature of a claim. 42 Ross directed that. a court should first examine the
practices of the premerger courts to determine whether the issue or its com-
ling on the question whether there was a right to jury trial.
38 Id. Prior to the merger of law and equity, courts of law refused to grant
shareholders standing to assert corporate claims. Thus, where the corporation declined
to institute an action on its own behalf, the shareholders had no remedy at law. In
consequence of the harshness of this rule, courts of equity developed the derivative
action, in which shareholders faced with the possibility of irreparable harm could seek
appropriate equitable remedies. Since rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure specifically recognized the shareholders' standing to assert the corporation's legal
claims, the Court in Ross concluded that the traditional rule relegating derivative ac-
tions to equity had been rendered "obsolete. - Id. at 540. Accordingly, in the aftermath
of Ross, the seventh amendment question is contingent on whether the claims being
asserted by the shareholders are "legal" in nature. See generally Note, The Right to a fury
Trial in a. Stockholder's Derivative Action, 74 YALE L.J. 725 (1965),
39 Sec text at note 26 supra. The Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen, and Ross deci-
sions have been interpreted by several courts as favoring the granting of jury trials in
cases where there is doubt as to whether the issues presented are "legal." See, e.g.,
Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 297 F. Stipp. 485, 489 (D. Minn.
1969); Gefen v. United States, 400 F.2d 476, 479 ti.5 (5th Cir. 1968), cited in 9 Wituurr
& MILLER, supra note II, § 230'2, at 21 0.51.
40 See 5 MooRE's, supra note 2. 11 38.16111441, at 153-162.9. The reason for
directing the inquiry to the jurisdiction of the law courts rather than the practices of
the chancery courts is that there is a constitutional right to trial by jury, whereas no
similar right attaches to proceedings in equity. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines,
374 U.S. 16 (1963). Thus, equity's practices prior to merger are not determinative of
whether there is a right to trial by jury.
41
 Professor James has observed that there are, for the most part, no such
things as inherently "legal issues" or inherently "equitable issues." There are only fac-
tual issues, and "like chameleons, [they] take their color from surrounding cir-
cumstances. - James, supra note 10, at (192. This passage was quoted approvingly in
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Ross. 396 U.S. at 550.
42 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
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mon law analogue was historically committed to jury determination. Secondly,
the court should consider whether the remedy sought is of the sort that was
traditionally available in the law courts. Finally, the Ross Court stated that the
court should determine whether the issues presented by the case are beyond
the "practical abilities and limitations of juries." 4"
The first two elements of the Ross test are presumably references to estab-
lished methods of seventh amendment analysis. The meaning of the third
element of the test is less certain. No authority was cited by the Ross Court for
the proposition that jury competence is relevant to the existence of a right to
jury trial. Nor did the Court indicate the relative weight to be accorded the
third element of the test in assessing the "legal" nature of a claim. Perhaps in
consequence of this lack of authority, the majority of courts that have applied
the Rays test have either ignored the third element" or determined that the
claims presented were not beyond the analytical ability of a jury. 45 In four
cases, however, the third element of the Ross test has been employed to deny
jury trial where the jury requests were otherwise warranted.'" In essence,
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 340-41 (4th Cir. 1971). The
Stanley court stated that the complexity of the issues, and the jury's ability to under-
stand them, was relevant with respect to damage issues, but not with respect to liability
issues. There was no reference to the Ross test.
'5 See, e.g., Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348, 351 (W.D. Mo. 1975)
(the right to jury trial under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Radial Lip
Nlach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 228 (N.D. III. 1977) (patent
infringement action); Jones v. Orenstein, ERA/. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (se-
curities fraud action); Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F. Stipp. 1121, 1125 (E.D.
Mich. 1974) (action for breach of duty of fair representation and collective bargaining
agreement).
41; See note 5 supra. Hyde Propertie.s. v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974), has
been cited as an additional authority for the proposition that there is no right to trial
by jury in complex civil cases. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Universal Pictures. Inc., 79 F.R.D.
59, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (discussed in text. at notes 65-73 infra). Such reference to Hyde,
however, would seem incorrect. The Hyde court, while observing that the ctu ► plicated
issues presented by the case were not especially suited for jury determination, nonethe-
less based its decision to deny,
 jury trial on a finding that equitable relief was necessary
to adequately redress the claims between the parties.
Hyde was an interpleader action brought by Hyde Properties, the maker of certain
promissory notes. The notes were originally issued by Hyde Properties to international
House of Pancakes of Tennessee, Inc., (I HP 1'), as payment for a building owned by
IHPT. [HP - E subsequently transferred the notes to McCoy, a shareholder of !HITE. 10
redeem all of McCoy's interest in IHPT. Some time later, the I.R.S. filed notices of tax
liens against IFIPT, and moved to levy upon Hyde Properties. Because of McCoy's
conflicting interest. in the notes, Hyde Properties filed an interpleader action against.
the United States and McCoy, and deposited sufficient funds with the court to satisfy
its obligation on the notes. Id. at 303-04.
The United States Government claimed that IHITI's redemption of' McCoy's stock
with the notes received from Hyde Properties was a fraudulent conveyance as to it as a
tax lien creditor. Id. at 304. McCoy argued that the transfer was not fraudulent as to
the Government, since, at the time of the redemption, IHPT was a solvent corpora-
tion. McCoy subsequently demanded a jury trial on the question of whether the trans-
fer was fraudulent. hi. The Government moved to strike McCoy's jury demand on the
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these courts have reasoned that judicially ordered recourse to equity is per-
missible in extraordinarily complex cases, regardless of the nature of" the un-
derlying issues, because the jury's inability to reach an intelligent decision im-
plies that the legal remedy is inadequate. These cases thus squarely present
the question whether Ross can justifiably be read to sanction a "complexity
exception- to the seventh amendment..
The question thus posed is significant in several respects. First., as the law
becomes increasingly complicated in response to commercial, social, and
technological developments, the legal and factual complexity of the typical law
suit will increase. It. can therefore be reasonably assumed that future courts
will encounter a greater number of cases presenting issues beyond the com-
prehension of the average juror. A seventh amendment analysis which prem-
ises the right to jury trial on a case-by-case examination of jury competence
thus threatens to severely curtail the availability' of jury trial in civil actions in
the federal courts. In a like fashion, if jury competence is ultimately adopted
as the constitutional weathervane of the right. to trial by jury, both judges and
prospective litigants will be faced with the task of determining when a com-
plex case is too complex for jury determination. This, in turn, will necessitate
ground that the interpleader proceeding was equitable in nature. The motion was de-
nied by the district court, and the case was conducted as a jury trial. Id.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit determined that the district
court had erred in denying the Government's motion to strike McCoy's jury demand.
Judge Miller, writing for the court, characterized the underlying issue in the case as
"whether or not the conveyance of the two promissory notes to McCoy was fraudulent
as to the Government. - Id. at 305. Judge Miller then proceeded to apply the Ross test.
in order to determine whether the identified issue was legal, and hence entitled to jury
resolution. Id. With reference to the first element of the Ross lest, Judge Miller ob-
served that "questions involving fraud cannot be classified front custom as solely legal
or solely equitable," and concluded that. "the nature of the remedy sought [is] consid-
erably more important in resolving the right to jury trial." Id. In looking to the nature
of the remedy sought in the case at bar, Judge Miller noted that, under Tennessee
law, a creditor has both a legal and an equitable remedy for a fraudulent conveyance.
Id. Because of the seventh amendment right of jury trial, however, Judge Miller con-
chided that a creditor may not proceed in equity unless the legal remedy is inadequate.
N. at 30i. Judge Millet- thereupon concluded that the legal remedy available under
Tennessee law—attachment or execution—"would be generally inadequate because of
the ease with which 1promissory notes] can he concealed or otherwise placed beyond
the reach of levy. - Id. He therefore determined that "equitable relief - was necessary for
enforcement of the Government's claims. - and held that the issue presented by the
case was equitable with respect to the second factor specified in Ross, the nature of the
remedy sought. Applying the third element of the Rocs test to the case at bar, Judge
Miller observed that "the jury [was] not especially well qualified - to deal with the con-
flicting and complicated financial issues involved in the action. Id. He therefore con-
cluded that "a non-jury trial of the issues is both more efficient and more likely to
produce ;t just result." Id.
Thus. although judge Miller did conclude that the action was beyond the practical
abilities and limitations of juries, his decision to deny jury trial can be justified solely in
terms of his characterization of the remedy sought as equitable. Hyde is therefore dis-
tinguishable from ILC Peripherals, Bernslein, United Stales Financial and Boise Cascade (see
note 5 supra), since in each of the latter four cases the issues presented were legal with
respect to both of the first two elements of the Ross test.
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the formulation of new and potentially unmanageable standards for deciding
when jury demands may be properly stricken From complicated civil actions.
Under such a standard, it is conceivable that even where quintessential jury
issues such as tort liability or contract damages are involved, the right to jury
trial would exist or not as a function of the overall complexity of the action.
In short, a vast new area of confusion would he interjected into an already
perplexing area of law.
A. The Cases: A Move Towards a. Complexity Exception
to the Seventh A mendment'slury Trial Guarantee
In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation 47 was the first case in which an
otherwise valid jury demand was stricken on the grounds that the litigation
exceeded "the ability of a jury to decide the facts in an informed and capable
manner." 48 The action arose when the assets of the Boise Cascade Corpora-
tion were devalued following the corporation's acquisition of a newsprint
company in exchange for shares of Boise Cascade stock. 4 " Relying on the
Ross test, Judge Sharp, of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington, concluded that both the complexity of the factual is-
sues involved in the action and the five to six months estimated trial time
indicated "that a jury would not he a rational and capable fact finder." 5" In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Sharp acknowledged that juries are ordinarily
presumed competent. 5 ' He felt that at some point, however, "it must he rec-
ognized that the complexity of a case may exceed the ability of a jury to
decide the facts in an informed and capable manner." 52 When that point is
reached, Judge Sharp reasoned, trial by jury is no longer constitutionally
mandated, since "the right and necessity of fairness is defeated by relegating
fact finding to a body not qualified to determine the facts." 55
47
 420 F. Stipp.' 99 (WI). Wash. 1976)•
48 Id. at 104.
" Id. at 101.
'" ht. at 103. The Boise Cascade court emphasized the intricate financial ques-
tions presented in the case, and the great volume of the evidence, stating:
Wu order to determine whether liability exists, the fact finder will have to
analyze ... the accounts, as they existed at the nine of the merger,. ..
[and] as plaintiffs claim they should have existed....
Competing theories of accounting will be presented for all of these
matters....
In sum, it appears to this Court that the scope of the problems pre-
sented by this case is immense. The factual issues, the complexity of the
evidence that will be required to explore those issues and the time required
to do so leads to the conclusion that a jury would not be a rational and
capable fact finder,
Id.
'' Id. at 104.
52 Id.
5 ' 1 Id. Judge Sharp concluded: "Mlle third part of the analysis in footnote H)
to the majority opinion in Ross v. Bernhard directly recognizes this." Id. (citations omit-
ted)..
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One year after the Boise Cascade decision, Judge Turrentine, writing for
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, or-
dered all jury demands stricken from In re United States Financial Securities
Litigation." United States Financial was a consolidated securities fraud action
arising out of the collapse of a massive real estate development. corpora-
tion .'' Liability was asserted against the various defendants under a variety
of state law theories and the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws.'" In justifying his decision to order a non-jury trial, Judge Turrentine
relied on both premerger custom and the Supreme Court's decision in Dairy
Queen and Ross. He determined initially that intricate accounting problems
were central to the resolution of the various claims in the case." In this
regard he noted that complicated accounting actions were historically commit-
ted to the jurisdiction of the equity courts," and concluded that neither
Beacon Theatres nor Dairy Queen had altogether eliminated that jurisdiction.
Rather, Judge Turrentine interpreted Dairy Queen as specifically authorizing
recourse to equity in cases where a special master appointed pursuant to rule
53(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would not meaningfully assist.
the jury in deciphering the accounts between the parties.'• Concluding that
the case at bar was within the rule of Dairy Queen,''" Judge Turrentine subse-
quently held that the parties were not entitled to jury trial."'
In addition to relying on equity's traditional jurisdiction over complicated
accounting actions, Judge Turrentine based his decison to deny jury trial on
the third clement of the Ross test." 2 He observed initially that a lay jury was
"singularly unqualified - to analyze and reconcile the many complicated ac-
counts between the parties."' This inability, in Judge Turrentine's view, op-
erated to render the legal remedy inadequate, since a finding of ultimate lia-
bility in the case was dependent on an intelligent analysis of the accounts
between the parties. He therefore concluded that the third element of the
54 75 F.R.D. 702, 705 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
55 Id. Liability was asserted by various purchasers and sellers of United Stales
Financials' common stock and debt instruments. hi. at 705-06.
Id. at 705-06.
57 Id. at 707. 712-13.
58 Id. at 709.
'' Id. aI 711.
''" Id. at 713. The court also concluded that severance of one or more of the
actions was impractical. Id. at 714.
GI id.
" .2 See text. at notes 42 and 43 supra.
"" 75 F,R.D. at 713. In connection Ivit.11 his assertion that the instant case was
beyond the practical abilities of jurors, Judge Turrentine argued that the estimated
length of trial—iwo years—would make the impaneling of any jury difficult. The
Boise Cascade court, echoing this sentiment, argued additionally that since few persons
possessing a sophisticated educational or financial background would he willing to
serve as a juror in a lengthy trial, the persons ultimately selected for jury service were
likely to be the least qualified persons to decide a complicated case. 420 F. Supp. at
104-05.
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Ross test was satisfied, and held that the parties were not entitled to jury trial
on any of the issues presented."
Relying on the precedent established by Boise Cascade and United States
Financial, Judge Brieant, of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, refused to permit a jury trial in Bernstein v. Universal
Pictures, Inc." 5 Bernstein was a complicated antitrust action brought against sev-
eral members of the motion picture and television industry."" Plaintiffs, a
class of musical composers and lyricists, alleged seven separate violations of
the antitrust laws and demanded a jury trial." In the ensuing six years, none
of the various defendants evidenced any objection to proceeding at law.
Nevertheless, Judge Brieant, of his own initiative, questioned the propriety of
submitting such a complicated case to a jury, and subsequently ordered that
the action be tried in equity." 8
In his opinion, Judge Brieant acknowledged that all of the claims pre-
sented in the action would normally be entitled to jury trial under the rule of
Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen." Similarly, he admitted that all of the issues
in the case were "legal" with respect. to both premerger federal practice and
the nature of the remedies sought. 7 u Notwithstanding this admission, how-
14 75 F.R. I). at 710-13. judge Turrentine enumerated three criteria for de-
termining when a case is so complicated that equity jurisdiction will attach and permit
the case to he tried without a jury:
First, although mere complexity is not enough, complicated accounting
problems are not generally amenable to jury resolution....
Second, the jury members must be capable of understanding and of
dealing rationally with the issues of the case.
And third, an unusually long trial may wake extraordinary demands
upon a jury which would make it difficult for the jurors to function effec-
tively throughout the trial.
Id. at 711. The court purportedly derived these guidelines from a series of cases deal-
ing with equity's power to decide complex accounting actions, and several modern
cases including the Dairy Queen decision.
The first factor is an accurate description of when the equity courts would take
jurisdiction over accounting matters. Sec text at notes 95-123 infra. Since Dairy Queen,
this description is no longer accurate; modern accounting plaintiffs must demonstrate
that appointment of a special master pursuant to rule 53(h) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would not materially assist the jury in deciphering the accounts be-
tween the parties. 75 F.R.D. at 711.
The second criterion is presumably a reference to the third prong of the Ross test.
However, its relevance to the seventh amendment question is not at all clear. See text
at. notes 128-34 infra.
The final element was adopted front the Boise. Cascade opinion. See 420 F. Supp. at
104-05. It. would appear relevant to the .jury trial question only insofar as it bears on
the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Obviously, if the second factor of the
test is of no consequence to whether there is a right to jury trial, the third factor is
similarly insignificant.
" 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 61.
6 7 id ,
68
 Id.
" 9 Id. at 65.
m Id. at 66-67,
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ever, Judge Brieant concluded that the practical abilities and limitations of
juries was a consideration of constitutional significance, operating to impose
an upper limit on the availability of jury trials under . the seventh amend-
ment. 7 ' He asserted that "the rule of Beacon Theatres and Dail Queen is itself
an 'equitable doctrine,'" 72 and refused to interpret those cases to require trial
by jury in actions where the jury was incapable of reaching an informed deci-
sion. Reasoning that the traditional equity powers of the Court. ... include
the power to strike a jury demand when to allow it to stand would work an
injustice," 73 Judge Brieant ordered the parties to proceed in equity with re-
spect to all issues raised by the suit.
The decision to order a non jury trial was arrived at by a slightly differ-
ent path in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines
Corp. 74 In ILC Peripherals, a complex antitrust action, defendant moved to
strike plaintiff's jury demand on the grounds that the case was too complex
for jury determination." Judge Conti, writing for the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, denied the motion, and the
parties proceeded to trial before a twelve man jury. 7" At the conclusion of a
five month trial, involving eighty-seven witnesses and more than 2,300 written
exhibits, the case was submitted to the jury. After nineteen days of delibera-
tion, the jury reported itself deadlocked and a mistrial was declared." De-
fendant I.B.M. subsequently moved for a directed verdict.'
In the course of granting I.B.M.'s motion, judge Conti chose to recon-
sider his earlier denial of defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's jury de- .
mand." He thereupon ordered the action tried in equity in the event of a
subsequent retrial." Referring to Bernstein, Boise Cascade and United States
Financial, Judge Conti stated that "the teaching of these three cases is that
where the issues in a case are beyond 'the practical abilities and limitations of
a jury,' the legal remedy is inadequate and equity jurisdiction will attach." Si
Drawing on his own five month ordeal, Judge Conti cited several factors
which, in his opinion, rendered the legal remedy in the instant case in-
adequate. First, he noted the difficulty the jury had in comprehending the
financial and technical concepts introduced at trial." According to Judge
71 Id. at 66. judge Brieant acknowledged that the third element of the Ross
test was "devoid of cited authority" and "regarded by some as a departure ... from
former law." Id. (citing Redish, supra note 15, at 526). However, he nonetheless con-
cluded that "the adequacy of the legal remedy necessarily involves the adequacy of the
jury and its competency to find the facts." 79 F.R.D. at 66.
72 Id. (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966)).
73 Id.
74 458 F. Supp, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
75 Id. at 444.
744
77 Id.
73 Id. at 426.
79 Id.
B1 Id. at 448.
81 Id. at 447.
82 Id.
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Conti, his suspicions of jury inadequacy were confirmed by the responses and
comments elicited from the jurors themselves." Observing that only one of
the jurors possessed even a modest technical background," Judge Conti re-
marked:
LIP. is understandable that people with such backgrounds would have
trouble applying concepts like cross-elasticity of supply and demand,
market share and market power, reverse engineering, product inter-
face manipulation, discriminatory pricing, barriers to entry,
exclusionary leasing, entreprenurial subsidiaries, subordinated de-
bentures, stock options, modeling, and etc. 85
As a second justification for his decision, Judge Conti noted that the trial
of the I.B.M. action had monopolized his time and staff for a period of five
months, thereby increasing the burden on the other judges in the district. 8" In
consequence of this experience, Judge Conti expressed the rather novel view
that:
While there nay be a right to a jury trial in every case ... where the
cost to both the litigants and the government of such a trial is as
great as it was in this case, and where the case is as technically and
financially complex as this one is, this right should be limited to one
jury trial. 87
Although Judge Coati's decision to disallow a jury trial in ILC Peripherals may
ultimately prove irrelevant if no retrial of the action is ordered, the case still
stands as authority for the proposition that complex cases are excepted from
the normal operation of the seventh amendment.
In summary, two basic contentions are central to the reasoning of Boise
Cascade and its progeny. First, these courts have argued that equity has the
inherent authority to order non jury trials in complex civil cases, which power
is unaffected by the seventh amendment; the Ross test, in their view, is but a
M3 Id. at 447-48. judge Conti emphasized that while the Bernstein, Boise Cascade
and United States Financial courts could Only speculate as to the jury's ability to under-
stand the case, he was able to base his decision on actual experience. Id. at 447. He
related that the jurtirs themselves reported that they were unable to understand the
technical and financial issues in the case. Id. at 448.
84
 Id. at 448.
"
Ht Id.
" Id. Judge Conti added: "Even if' one does not want to eliminate jury trials
completely in complex antitrust cases, then surely if the first trial results in a mistrial.
the system, and probably the parties themselves, are better served if the decision is
ultimately' made by the court, with the right of the parties to supplement the record.''
Professor James has noted that "[all no dine in history was the line dividing equity
from law altogether—or even largely—the product of a rational choice between issues
that were better suited to court or to itit•y antes, .supra note 10, at Oil. But see
Note, The Right to /1 Nonjury Trial. 74 HARV. L. REv, 1171i, 1181 (1¶WI) (suggesting that
some actions were tried in equity because they we re "unsuitable for resolution by the
typically illiterate jury'').
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recognition of this traditional authority." Secondly, these courts have
reasoned that even if the seventh amendment does not sanction an exception
for complex cases, considerations of fairness and due process militate against
permitting trial by jury in situations where common sense impels the recogni-
tion that a jury is incapable of rendering an intelligent verdict." The consti-
tutionality of these four decisions thus rests partly on the accuracy of their
characterization of the seventh amendment, and partly on whether the due
process clause can be read to override the seventh amendment's jury re-
quirement in cases where trial by jury bodes the possibility of an irrational
jury verdict.
The following section of this article will demonstrate that no exception
for complex cases inheres in the seventh amendment. It will be submitted that
jury competence is irrelevant to the resolution of the seventh amendment
question, regardless of whether the question is viewed in the context of pre-
merger practice or modern interpretations of the jury right. Finally, the dis-
cussion will address the contention that the clue process clause provides consti-
tutional justification for removing difficult cases from the jury, regardless of
the legal character of the issues involved.
B. Analysis: Complexity, Jury Competence
and the Right to Jury Trial at Common Law
There is little to suggest that considerations of factual complexity and
amenability to jury resolution were historically germane to the jurisdictional
allocation between law and equity. 99 Rather, whether an action would be
tried at law or in equity depended largely on factors other than the relative
ability of the jury as a trier of fact." Foremost among these factors were the
procedural differences between the two tribunals."' For example, at common
law, parties to a suit at law were prohibited from testifying on their own be-
half. Thus, where the testimony of the parties was required to shed light on
the underlying dispute, they would be forced to proceed in equity, since they
were incompetent to testify at law.`''' Similarly, if equitable remedies such as
injunction or specific performance were necessary to redress the grievances
between the parties, equity would assume jurisdiction because the law courts
were incompetent to award equitable forms of relief. 14
This is not to say that the practical abilities and limitations of juries were
never relevant to the decison to grant or deny jury trial. The existence of
" See 79 F.R.D. at 67; 458 F. Supp. at 445-46; 75 F.R.D. at 710; 420 F. Stipp.
at 105.
89 See 79 F.R.D. at 71; 458 F. Supp. at 447-48; 75 F.R.D. at 712-13; 420 F.
Supp. at 104.
!" 1 See James, supra note 10, at 661 & n.39.
9 ' See rd. at 661-63 & nn.39-47. As Professor James phrased it, "jury trial (or
court trial) was often merely the tail of the clog under a system where you had to take
the whole clog." Id. at 662.
92 Id. at 661-62.
" 3 Id. at 662.
94 Id.
526	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:511
complex accounts between the parties provided a traditional basis for equity
jurisdiction.`'' Although this jurisdiction may have resulted partially from the
procedural deficiencies of the law courts," concern over the jury's ability to
unravel complicated financial transactions was undeniably a major considera-
tion prompting equity to act.' Outside the ambit of accounting actions,
however, a review of the cases provides little support for the contention that
practical abilities and limitations of juries were primary considerations in de-
termining whether an action should be tried at law or in equity." 8
"' See, e.g., Kirby v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134
(1887), where the Court stated that -Nile complicated nature of the accounts between
the parties constitutes itself a sufficient ground for going into equity. -
Equity's jurisdiction over accounting actions that were also cognizable at law was
limited to situations where the accounts were so complicated that only a court of equity
could unravel them. See j. McCUNrocK, EQurry §§ 200, 202, at 537-38, 540-41 (2d ed.
1948). Thus equity had no jurisdiction over cases where the accounts were simple or
merely numerous and not difficult. Equity's jurisdiction over complicated accounting
actions was reaffirmed in Dairy Queen although its availability was limited to situations
where the accounts between the parties are so complex that a jury could not unravel
them, even with the assistance of a special master. 369 U.S. at 478.
"" Equity's jurisdiction over complicated accounting actions may have stemmed
at least partially from the unavailability of party testimony and pre-trial discovery at
law, since the parties themselves frequently were the only persons possessing sufficient
knowledge of the underlying transactions to shed light on their dispute. James, supra
note 10, at 662-113.
" 7 The Eighth Circuit expressed this concern in McMullen Lumber Co. v.
Strother, 136 F. 295 (8th Cir. 1905):
How would it be possible for a jury, through a protracted, tedious hearing,
to carry such infinite details in their minds, and work out such problems in
the wranglings of the jt.try room? That any result, Under such conditions,.
reached by a jury, in.) matter how intelligent or honest., would necessarily
be something of guesswork, does not admit of debate.... Indeed, the con-
scientious judge who should sit in the trial of such a case to a jury would
feel impelled, in assisting the jury to a just result, to quite nigh perform
the part of a chancellor in reviewing and analyzing the many details of the
evidence Under the conditions that would inevitably attend such a
trial the judge's own review and analysis could he but superficial, ancl
probably ition - rect.
136 F. at 304.
Indeed, the opposite appears to have been (rue. See, e.g., Curriden v. Mid-
dleton, 232 U.S. (133, 636 (1914) ("It is said that the facts are complicated, but they are
not so on the allegations of the bill, which merely discloses a series of acts alleged to
have been parts of the plan to deceive, and further, mere complication of'facts alone and
difficulty of . proof are not a basis of equity jurisidiction. -) (emphasis added); But or Goffe &
Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 2(i F.2(.1 801, 804 (I). Kan. 1928) ("while mere
difficulty of proof is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon equity, yet if the action is
one for an accounting, and the account presented is so difficult, complicate(' and confus-
ing That a jury cannot handle it, all action may properly be brought in equity for the
purpose of taking all accounting. But the field is a narrow one. -) (emphasis added). See
also United States v. Bitter Root Der. Co., 201) U.S. 451 (190I1). The Bernstein court,
after reviewing these cases, found that, to the extent they required all accounting in
addition to factual ccanplexity before the aid of' equity could be invoked, the require-
ment was satisfied in Bernstein. 79 F.1,2,1). at 7t). While judge Brit:aril's interpretation of
the rule of these cases is correct, Bernstein can not be properly termed an -accounting
action." See text and notes 108-21 infra.
March 1979] 	 SEVENTH AMENDMENT
	 527
Admittedly, some of the early English cases suggest. that concern over the
analytical abilities of the jury prompted equity to act in other types of cases
where the claims involved would normally have been tried at law.• In Clench
v. Toinley,'"" for example, an equity court enjoined an ejectment proceeding at
law because proof of liability depended on an analysis of documents consid-
ered to be beyond the capacity of "a jury of ploughmen." 101 Similarly, in
Wohlerburn v. Pickering,'" the court quoted with approval the "old rule" 1i 3
expressed by Clark v. Cooks-on "4
 that some cases are "from great complexity or
otherwise, not capable of being conveniently tried before a jury." 1 O 5
 The
institution of jury trial evolved quite differently in America than in England,
however, and the rule of these cases seems not to have been generally fol-
lowed in the United States.°' Thus, only to the extent that a case may be
properly terined an "action for an accounting" does there appear to he au-
thority for a complexity exception to the seventh amendment."'
The accounting action was horn in the common law action of "account
render."	 Account render was narrow in scope and would lie only against
persons having a legal duty to account to the plaintiff.'
	 The procedure at
"" The four courts denying jury trial in complex cases attempted to draw sup-
port front these cases. See, e.g., Bernstein, 79 F.R.D. at 67 ("fflar frmn being an innova-
Mtn, consideration of 'the practical abilities anti limitations of juries,' ... is actually the
restatement of the Court's traditional equity powers. The early common law, in an age
when many jurors could not read, reserved for itself matters involving complex writ-
ings." (citations omitted)).
11 "" 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603).
1.t
13 Ch. D. 769 (1879).
l"" Id. at 771. However the "rule" appears to have developed king after the
enactment of the seventh amendment.. It is thus of questionable precedential value in
ascertaining the existence of a complexity exception 10 the seventh amendment. See
text and note 106 infra.
1 " 2 Ch. D. 746 (1875),
105 Id. at 747-48.
"'" The jury as an institution did not enjoy the same esteem in English practice.
Sec generally L. Moottr, THE juxv, Toot. or Kixcs, PALLADIUNI OF LIBERTY (1973). The
civil jury has essentially disappeared from modern English practice by virtue of Par-
liamentary decree. Id. at 125 -30,
' 07 The Bernstein court cited Fowle v. Lawrason, 30 U.S. (5 Pet,) 495, 503
(1831), for the proposition that equity's power to dispense with a jury in complex cases
was not limited to actions for an accounting. 79 F.R.D. at 67-68. That case stated: "In
all cases in which an action of account would be the proper remedy at law, ... the
jurisdiction of a Court of equity is undoubted. Rut in transactions not of this peculiar
character, great complexity ought to exist in the accounts, or some great difficulty at.
law should interpose.... in order to induce a Court of chancery to exercise jurisdic-
tion. - It is doubtful that this passage can he accorded the broad meaning favored by
the Bernstein court. Rather the passage refers to the limitations on equity's traditional
jurisdiction over accounting matters, and should not be interpreted as sanctioning a
broad complexity exception to the seventh amendment. See text and notes 114-23
infra. See generally 9 WRIGHT MILLER, supra note 11, § 2310, at 48 & nn.67-69,
inti Williams
 v. Collier, 32 F. Stipp. 321, 324 (ED, Pa. 1940),
'"" Persons having a legal duty to account. included guardians, bailiffs, receivers,
and the like. 5 MooRE's, supra note 2. 11 38.25, at 198. See also Life, Bills for Accounl, 8
VA. L. Rev. 181 (1921).
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law was considerably involved, requiring the plaintiff to establish initially that
the defendant had a legal duty to render an accounting."° If the plaintiff
prevailed on this issue, the court would enter an interlocutory decree to that
effect, and the matter would be referred to auditors for the actual rendition
of the account."' Disputed entries were submitted to the jury for resolution,
and if the plaintiff ultimately prevailed a final judgment was entered in his
favor.' 12
Because of the relatively cumbersome nature of this proceeding, the
common law action of account render gradually gave way to the more flexible
proceeding in equity.' 13
 Equity's jurisdiction over accounting actions, how-
ever, was not plenary. Rather, it was limited to three basic situations: 14 (I)
equity could require an accounting where the duty to account was itself of
equitable origin, as where the accounting was sought from a trustee by a cestui
roue trust; "5
 (2) equity could give an accounting where the claim was otherwise
legal, if the request for an accounting was incidental to a demand for equi-
table relief; 11 " and (3) equity could require an accounting where the accounts
between the parties were so complicated that a jury would have difficulty un-
derstanding therm"?
In a strict sense, the accounting action was limited, both in law and in
equity, to cases where there was a history of financial transactions or business
dealings between the parties, and it was alleged that a balance was owing." 8
Thus, the term "accounting" traditionally referred to either the balance due
on a statement of dealings or the right of action for that balance." 8
 An
"I" 5 MooRE's, supra note 2,11 38.25, at 198; Belsheim, The Old Action of Account,
45 HARV. L. REV. 466, 493-94 (1932).
5 MooRE's, supra note 2. 11 38.25, at 198-99; Belsheim, supra note 110, at
496-97. The court would issue a writ of capias to bring the defendant before the
auditors. 5 MooRE's, supra note 2, "I 38.25, at 198; Belsheim, supra note 110, at 496.
" 2 5 MooRE's, supra note 2, 17 38.25, at 198; Belsheim, supra note 110, at 497-
98. If the defendant was found to owe a balance on his account, he was ordered to pay
the plaintiff. On the other hand, if an examination of the accounts revealed that the
plaintiff had been overpaid, the defendant could use the auditor's report as a basis of
an action in debt against the plaintiff. 5 MooRE's, supra note 2, II 38.25, at 198-99;
Belsheim, supra note 110, at 498-99.
13 5 MOORE'S, supra note 2,	 38.25, at 198; Belsheim, supra note 110, at 499-
500.
114 See generally 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 2310, at 48.
I" Williams v. Collier, 32 F. Supp. 321, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1940). See generally
McCLIN -rocK, SUpra note 95, § 201, at 538.
" 6
 See, e.g., Root v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R.R., 105 U.S. (15 Otto.)
189, 205 (1882); Hirsch v. Glidden Co., 79 F. Supp, 729, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Where the primary cause of action was not of 2111 equitable nature, equity had no
jurisdiction over the incidental accounting claim, unless jurisdiction could be justified
on one of the two other grounds. 5 MooRE's, .supra note 2, t 38.25, at 200 n.12 (citing
Universal Pictures Corp. v. Marsh, 36 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. W. Va. 1940)).
" 7 See McCi.D.-rocR, supra note 95, § 202-03, at 540. Equity jurisdiction in com-
plicated accounting actions is founded on the inadequacy of the legal remedy. See also
Kirby v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887).
. " 8
 Harnischfeger Saks Corp. v. Pickering Lumber Co., 97 F. 2d 692, 694-95
(8th Cir. 1938).
19 Id.
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accounting action would therefore not lie for unliquidated damages, such as
those arising from a breach of contract, or for damages arising from tortious
conduct generally."" Nor did it. extend to every situation where an examina-
tion of financial records was required to assess liability or calculate dam-
ages; 121 indeed, the assessment of damages was regarded as the "peculiar of-
fice of a jury." 122 In short, the common law action for an accounting,
whether brought. at law or in equity, was relatively narrow in scope. 12:1
If reference is had to this limited definition of accounting actions at
common law, none of the four cases striking jury demands on complexity
grounds appears to come within the ambit of equity's jurisdiction over compli-
"" Id. United States v. Bitter Root. Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 478 (1906) ("There
are no accounts between the parties. The cause of action is one arising in tort and
cannot be converted into one for an account.").
121 See, e.g., City of Sedalia v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 66 F.2d 757, 761
(8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 706 (1934) ("This suit was brought as a suit in
equity for an accounting. There is no allegation of mutual accounts or any other sub-
ject. of equitable cognizance, but it was the theory of the bill that an accounting is
authorized because it will be necessary to consider many transactions between the de-
fendant and its customers, and to examine the books and records .... rnhese facts
present no grounds for maintenance of a suit in equity for an accounting.").
1 " Root v. Lake Shore & Michigan R.R., 105 U.S. 189, 207 (1882). For a view
that a jury's inability to calculate the amount of damages does not preclude jury trial
on the liability issues. see Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 340-41 (4111 Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971).
123 Despite the relatively narrow definition of "accounts" and accounting at
coin inon law, the terms, in common parlance, have come to be employed as a generic
reference to financial transactions of every kind, especially where those transactions
are recorded in "accounts" for bookkeeping purposes. Thus, modern actions arc fre-
quently styled as demands for an "accounting," even though the claim is in reality for
money damages. See, e.g., Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 500 (1959). In Dairy Queen,
the Court held that the label employed in the pleadings was not controlling for pur-
poses of a right to jury trial. Thus, even though the action was characterized as one
for an "accounting," the Court held that it was a legal claim for money damages on
which there was a right to jury trial. 369 U.S. at 478-79. Gf Sid & Marty Kroft Televi-
sion Prods., Inc. v. NIcDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1977) (an
action is not converted into an accounting action simply because matters involving the
profession:al expertise of accountants arc in issue).
As a result of the Dairy Queen decision, equity's traditional jurisdiction over ac-
countings incidental to otherwise legal claims no longer exists. 369 U.S. at. 473. Equity's
power to dispense with jury trial in complicated :accounting actions has been limited to
situations where a special master is unable to meaningfully assist the jury in decipher-
ing the accounts between the parties. Id. at 478. Most lower courts have accepted the
Dairy Queen Court's statement that "it will indeed be a rare case" where the remedy of
law is inadequate because of the complexity of the accounts between the parties. See,
e.g., Stockton v. Altman, 432 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1970) (complicated partnership ac-
counting triable to jury since matter could be referred to a master); Kennedy v. Lasko
Co., 414 F.2d 1249 (1969) (suit for patent infringement seeking an accounting for
profits and damages entitled to jury trial). See alto Broderick v. American Gen. Corp.,
71 F.2d 864, 867 (4th Cir. 1934) (decided before Dairy Queen but expressing same
principle).
Dairy Queen does not affect equity jurisdiction over accounting actions where the
duty to account is itself of equitable origin. See 9 VarRicwr & Nhi.LER„supra note I I, §
2310, at 50.
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cated accounting matters. In all of these cases, the underlying cause of action
was for money damages, and an "accounting" was required only in the sense
that the determination of liability and damages necessitated an examination
and analysis of financial records. In United States Financial and Boise Cascade,
for example, the claims were brought for damages under the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws, and thus sounded in tort rather than ac-
counting.'" Similarly, in Bernstein and ILC Peripherals, the complaint sought
money damages for various violations of the antitrust laws." 5
 Thus, despite
the existence of complex corporate accounts and accounting questions in these
cases, none can be honestly characterized as a traditional action for an ac-
counting.
. Jury competence and factual complexity thus appear to have been gener-
ally irrelevant to the adequacy of the remedy at common law."" Indeed,
with the limited exception of an action for an accounting, the jury's inability
to rationally decide the issue in a case did not hear on the existence of a right
to jury trial. In this light, it would seem that the power to order non-jury
trials in complex cases, other than those for an accounting, was not among the
traditional powers of the equity courts. History therefore fails to support the
contention of the Boise Cascade line of cases—that claims normally triable at
law may be transferred into equity whenever the complexity of the case casts
doubt on the jury's competence as a factfinder.
Admittedly, as a logical proposition, there is little basis for distinguishing
between complex accounting actions and other types of complicated commer-
cial suits; if the adequacy of the legal remedy with respect to the former ac-
tion is affected by the quality and intelligence of the finder of fact, then the
latter should be similarly affected. However, the seventh amendment com-
mands that the right to jury trial shall be preserved. The inquiry must there-
fore focus not on whether trial by jury is the most efficacious means of decid-
"4
 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j,
proscribes fraudulent conduct in all forms of securities dealings. An action under §
10(b) (or § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k), thus appears analogous to the co ► -
mon law action of deceit, an action sounding in tort. L. Loss, 3 SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961). The Supreme Court has specifically held that damages for
deceit are unavailable in equity "when the like amount could he recovered in an action
sounding in tort or for money had and received." Buzard v. Houston, 119 U.S. 347,
352 (1886). See also Equitable Life Ins. Soc'y v. Brown, 213 U.S. 25, 50-51 (1909).
There is little doubt that actions for money damages under § 10(b) and related sec-
tions of the federal securities laws are entitled to jury trial. See, e.g., Aid Auto Stores,
Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468, 469 n.1 (24 Cir. 1975) (§§ 10(b) and 12 of the 1933
Act); Hopkins University v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 916 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 916 (1974) (§ 10(b) and §§ 12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act).
125
 Antitrust actions are essentially actions for money damages which are legal
claims carrying a right to jury trial on demand. See Fleitinan v. Welsbach, 240 U.S. 27
(1916), where the Court stated: "[W]e agree with the courts below that when the pen-
alty of triple damages is sought to be inflicted, the statute should not he read as at-
tempting to authorize liability to be enforced otherwise than through the verdict of a
jury in a court of common law." Id. at 29.
12ii The inadequacy of the legal remedy is the prerequisite to proceeding in
equity. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478, 479.
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ing the action, but rather on whether there is a right to jury trial,
notwithstanding the relative merit of trial to the court. alone. Thus, unless the
directive of Ross v. Bernhard to consider the "practical abilities and limitations
of juries" 127 represents a latter day reversal of the preceding 200 years of
judicial thought on the scope of the jury right, Boise Cascade and its progeny
have erred in concluding that trial by jury is not constitutionally mandated in
complex civil cases.
C. The Ross Test and Its Relationship to the Right of Trial
by Jury Under the Seventh Amendment
Given the rather limited historical relevance of complexity and jury com-
petence to the right to a jury trial, it is difficult to imagine what the Ross
Court contemplated when it directed consideration of the practical abilities
and limitations of juries. Most of the lower courts which have employed the
Ross test to ascertain the existence of a right to jury trial have done so without
discussion. Indeed, with the exception of the four cases discussed, courts
which have applied the Ross test have uniformly concluded that. the cases in-
volved were amenable to jury resolution.'"
Of the courts and commentators that have considered the issue, most have
rejected the contention that the third element of the Ross test represents a
limitation on the right to jury trial under the seventh amendment.. 12 `•1 judge
Friendly, for example, has commented that 13u
the footnote in Ross v. Bernhard was part of an argument for apply-
ing the Seventh Amendment right. to jury trial where it had not been
recognized before the merger of law and equity—not a suggestion
that the type of statute which had uniformly been held to carry the
right of jury trial should now be construed to eliminate it.
On closer examination, it would appear that Judge Friendly's argument
against a sweeping interpretation of the Ross test is correct.. The Court itself
failed to consider the practical abilities and limitations of juries in connection
with the jury trial question presented in Ross. The jury's relative ability as a
factfinder was similarly ignored by the Court in subsequent decisions on the
scope of the right to jury trial."'
127 Id. at 538 n.10.
'" See, e.g., Pons v. Lorrilard, 549 F.2d 950, 954 (4th Cir. 1977), affil, 434 U.S.
575 (1978); Minnis v. International Union, U.A.W., 531 F.2d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir.
1975); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D. Or. 1977); Cleverly v.
Western Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348, 351 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc.,
384 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467
F.2d 727, 734-41 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
128 See Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224,
226-28 (N.D. III. 1977). See also United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2t1 414.
428-29 (2d Cir. 1974). C.f. Crane v. American Standard Co., 490 F.2d 332, 344 (2d Cir.
1973).
13U United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 428 (1974).
131 See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Pernell v. Southall Realty,
416 U.S. 363 (1974).
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Even if it is accepted that the Court intended to engender a case-by-case
analysis of jury competence, it does not follow that an entire action may be
removed from the jury's province upon a finding that the case, as a whole, is
beyond the jury's practical abilities and limitations. As the Ross Court ob-
served, the seventh amendment inquiry is a generic one, focusing on whether
the claims comprising the law suit are of the sort customarily entitled to jury
resolution." 2 Thus, even if it. is accepted that jury competence is relevant to
the resolution of the seventh amendment question, the analysis should prop-
erly center on the jury's capacity to intelligently assess each of the individual
types of issues underlying the action; if it were to he concluded that a particu-
lar issue was beyond the intellectual abilities of the jury—and hence equitable
in nature—it would not preclude jury resolution of the remaining issues. The
classification of this issue as equitable, however, would preclude jury determi-
nation of issues of the same type, and this preclusion would apply not only in
the context of the particular law suit under consideration, but to the issue
generally, regardless of the circumstances in which it was raised*" • Using
antitrust litigation as an illustration, the existence of a right to jury trial would
depend on whether the jury was competent to decide antitrust claims generally
and not on whether the jury was able to decide the particular antitrust case at
bar. Thus, if the court were to determine that antitrust claims were beyond
the analytical expertise of a lay jury, there would be no right to jury trial in
antitrust actions generally, no matter how uncomplicated the facts of the indi-
vidual case. The confusion that such a practice would engender, and the po-
tentially drastic curtailment of the jury right that would result, are additional
arguments against attributing constitutional weight to the third element of the
Ross text.
132 396 U.S. at 538. The Court stated: "The Seventh Amendment question de-
pends on the nature of the issue to he tried rather than the character of the overall
action," Thus, although a case might be described as basically equitable, if any legal
claim is present, there is a right to jury trial on that issue. See Swofford v. B & W, Inc.,
336 F.2d 906, 409 (5th Cir. 1964). In Swofford, the court emphasized that the nature of
the issues comprising the action, rather than the overall posture of the case, is the
controlling factor in determining whether there is a constitutional right to jury trial. Id.
"3 See Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 229,
227 (N.D. III. 1974), where the court stated:
The three Ross criteria are guides for determining whether a claim typically
has a sufficient quantum of legal elements so that it must he tried to a
jury.... The inquiry is a generic one, directed toward classifying a group
of claims.... Once the court finds that the nature of an issue is basically
legal, the right to jury trial exists for that entire class of claims. 'The por-
tion of the Ross test which weighs the practical abilities and limitations of
juries contemplates a general analysis of the problems typically presented
by those claims, not a specific case-by-case analysis for the complexity of
the litigation.... The test. is used in characterize a single issue as legal or
equitable. It does not analyze the entire framework of the lawsuit. The
focus is a narrow one. Complex lawsuits with multiple claims and parties
must be broken down into their constituent parts. If any legal cause is
apparent, the right to a jury trial exists.
Id. at 227. See also In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litigation, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SE.c. 1.. REP. (CCH) '11 96.015 (D. Ran. 1977).
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In summary, a survey of the relevant case law reveals little evidence to
support the contention that the Ross test was intended to create a general
complexity exception to the seventh amendment's jury trial guarantee. Rather,
the more reasonable interpretation of the third prong of the Ross test is that it
was merely a reference to equity's traditional jurisdiction over complex ac-
counting actions. 14
 Thus, to the extent that Bernstein, ILC Peripherals, Boise
Cascade, and United Stales Financial relied on Ross to support their decisions to
deny jury trial, they would appear to be in error.
D. The Due. Process Clause As a Limitation on the Availability
of Jury Trial Under the Seventh Amendment
It has been demonstrated in the preceding sections of this article that
neither prernerger practice nor modern interpretations of the seventh
amendment right to jury trial lend justification to a test for jury trial based
on considerations of jury competence. From a practical perspective, however,
it seems absurd to delegate the task of factfinding in complex cases to a deci-
sion making body of dubious competence. Such a result, while perhaps
mandated by the preservative nature of the seventh amendment, appears re-
pugnant to both the principles of fairness that underlie the jury right, and
traditional notions of substantive and procedural due process.
In an attempt to resolve this apparent conflict between the right of trial
by jury and the right to a fair trial, at least one author has advocated the
adoption of a "due process standard" for the right to jury trial." 6 Linder this
standard, the due process clause would operate to impose an "upper limit" on
the availability of trial by jury under the seventh amendment; in cases where
the level of complexity casts doubt on the jury's ability to reach a fair and
rational decision, application of the proposed due process standard would
permit the trial judge to order a non-jury trial, regardless of whether the case
involved legal claims. Thus, adoption of a due process standard in connection
with the right to jury trial would permit courts to freely dispense with jury
trials in complex cases without forcing them to employ reasoning offensive to
traditional seventh amendment analysis.
Despite the relative attractiveness of a clue process standard for jury trial,
it is nevertheless doubtful that the fourteenth amendment can be legitimately
employed to require a non jury trial in cases where the jury is incapable of
reaching an intelligent decision. An obvious constitutional barrier to the adop-
tion of a clue process standard is presented by the prospective nature of its
proposed application. No due process injury can occur until such time as a
jury actually renders an arbitrary verdict. A denial of jury trial on due process
134 See Van Ermen v. Schmidt, 374 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (W.D. Wis. 1974). The
Ross footnote immediately followed a discussion of the Dairy Queen case. 396 U.S. at
538.
'" Note, Jury Trials in Protracted Commercial Litigation, 10 U. CONN. L. REV. 775
(1978). See also Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV, L.
Rev. 898 (1979). See generally, Kane. Civil Jury Trial: The Case for Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28
HASTINGS L. J. 1 (1976).
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grounds would thus function in the nature of anticipatory relief, since at the
time the mode of trial is determined, the injury is merely threatened.""
Against this prospect of harm to the clue process rights of the party opposing
jury trial must. be balanced the vested seventh amendment. rights of his adver-
sary. Accordingly, courts would seem to be constitutionally required to employ
the method of protecting the due process rights of the litigants that least im-
pinges on the right to trial by jury.
Interestingly, federal civil procedure already encompasses a method for
protecting the due process rights of litigants. By permitting complex cases to
he tried to a jury where a right to jury trial is otherwise indicated, the seventh
amendment rights of the litigants are preserved. If the verdict reached is it
rational one, no injury is done to the clue process rights of either party. Con-
versely, if the jury's verdict is clearly arbitrary, the court may enter judgment
non obstante verdicto, thereby preventing the due process injury which would
otherwise occur.'" Admittedly, this method provides no solution to the
many administrative difficulties created by the jury trial of complex civil ac-
tions. However, it has the virtue of preserving and protecting the constitu-
tional rights of all parties involved. Thus, the Constitution would seem to
require that it be employed in preference to a method that more severely
restricts the right to jury trial.
Even aside from constitutional considerations, the adoption of a clue pro-
cess standard in the jury trial area portends a host. of practical difficulties. An
obvious difficulty would lie in formulating precise, objective standards for de-
termining when the complexity of a case is such that clue process requires the
denial of jury trial. Factors such as the projected length of trial, the number
of parties and claims involved, the presence or absence of sophisticated finan-
cial or technological concepts, and the quantity of evidence to be adduced at
trial are all theoretically relevant to the typical jury's ability to understand and
rationally analyze the issue before it. Yet, it is difficult, if not altogether im-
possible, to specify with precision what. combination of these factors must be
present to transform the ordinary case into one beyond the practical abilities
and limitations of juries.'" Regardless of where the line were to be drawn, a
due process standard that attempted to delineate specific guidelines for deny-
ing the right to jury trial would necessarily be somewhat. arbitrary.' 39
' 3 " A possible exception to this statement is ILC Peripheratc. There the court. had
an opportunity to actually assess the practical abilities and limitaticms of juries before
ordering a non-jury trial. See text at notes 74-85 supra. However, the decision would still
seem erroneous in terms of the court's authority lo order j.n.o.v. Moreover, there is
no way of predicting with certainty whether a second jury would suffer from the same
analytical deficiencies as the first.
137 See Jones v. Orenstein, 73 KR."). fiO4, 60r; (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
' 3" In a sense, Ihe problems inherent in creating due process guidelines for
removing complex cases from the jury are the same problems that would arise from
the adoption of the Rays test as the constitutional standard for jury trial. In each case,
the standard would necessarily be arbitrary.
13" One author has suggested the following guidelines for a due process excep-
tion to the seventh amendment's jury trial guarantee:
(1) For administrative convenience a presumption could be established
whereby only specific actions, such as antitrust or securities, could qualify
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The problems inherent. in the application of a clue process standard to
the right to jury trial would not he diminished if a strict clue process standard
were eschewed in Favor of a flexible approach—one that granted courts the
discretion to grant or deny jury trial depending on the facts of each case.
Such a discretionary standard would make jury trial an open issue in every law
suit, no matter what its relative degree of factual complexity: 4" Litigants
would find it virtually impossible to determine in advance whether they were
entitled to jury trial. Under such circumstances, trial preparation would be-
come doubly difficult. since the parties would be forced to prepare both pos-
sible modes of trial. The administrative nightmare that such a situation would
engender could easily surpass the burden presently imposed on the federal
courts by jury trials in complex civil actions. In short, however practically de-
sirable it might be to limit the availability of jury trial to those cases presenting
issues of relative simplicity, the clue process clause would seem neither a prac-
tical nor constitutional means of achieving that goal.
III.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE JURY TRIAL
PROBLEM IN COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION
In a broader sense. Boise Cascade and its progeny are not so much an
indictment of the jury's effectiveness as an institution as they are a reaction to
the heavy burden imposed on the overtaxed federal judiciary by complex civil
litigation. No matter what the ultimate outcome on the jury trial question with
regard to either the due process clause or the seventh amendment, the basic
task of devising a rational means of dealing with massive law suits remains. In
the long run, the answer may lie in redrafting the laws with a view towards
eliminating the more esoteric bases for lawsuits; the 'Jury trial problem" may
be more a function of the laws which juries are asked to enforce than a prod-
uct of any inherent deficiency in the institution of jury trial: 4 '
for evaluation under the test to determine whether the required complex-
ity was present; and (2) the anticipated trial length should he estimated to
determine whether it is likely that highly skilled and experienced persons
will he represented adequately in the jury. Uniformity may he achieved by
setting a fixed dine period to serve as the standard.
Note, Jury Trials in Protracted Commercial Litigation, 10 U. CONN. L. REV. 775, 798-99 &
n.I18 (1978) (the author suggested four weeks). This proposal suffers from consider-
able analytical and practical difficulties. For one thing. if it is accepted that the due
process clause commands non-jury trial in cases beyond the comprehension of the
jury, there would seem to he no basis for limiting the test to securities or antitrust
actions. Similarly, the requirement that the length of trial be in excess of four weeks
does not account for those cases which take under four weeks for trial, but which are
nonetheless beyond the analytical skill of the jury.
"" See Radial Lip, 76 FAA/ at 227 ("jury competence would be an open ques-
tion in every law suit.").
"' See Shaffer, Those Complex Antitrust Cases, Wall St. j., Aug. 29, 1978, at 16,
col. 4, stating: "All this may say less about the jury system than about the laws juries
are being asked to consider. if antitrust. and securities cases are so difficult to com-
prehend it may be a sign that in those areas the law itself needs to he reconsidered.
Might it also mean that juries are being forced to render judgments on the bases of
legal theories that are losing touch with reality?-
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Meanwhile, courts are not powerless to lift themselves out of the adminis-
trative quagmire engendered by mammoth civil suits. Numerous procedural
devices can and should be employed by courts and litigants alike to pare the
complex case clown to a manageable size. The liberal and effective use of
pre-trial conferences, 142 for example, can organize and streamline the action
for trial." 3 In a similar manner, issues which are uncontested or not fairly
controvertible can be eliminated from the action by agreement of the parties
or through the vehicle of partial summary judgment."' In an appropriate
case, magistrates or special masters can be appointed by the court to oversee
pre-trial discovery, prepare factual memoranda, or assist generally in pre-
paring the action for trial. 145 Severance of parties or claims, wherever it is
possible to do so without prejudice to the rights of the litigants, can also aid in
simplifying the complicated case, as can other procedural duties too numerous
to mention here.'"
Just as pre-trial devices can be utilized to reduce the complexity of the
litigation, methods are available for assisting the jury both before and after
the actual trial. Some courts have permitted jurors to take notes during
trial." 7 Similarly, in some instances juries have been allowed to take tran-
scripts of testimony and trial exhibits with them into the jury room.'" De-
192 The Southern District of New York has long employed an extensive system
of pretrial conferences to simplify cases for trial. See generally Solomon, Techniques for
Shortening Trials, 65 F.R.D. 485 (1974); Pollack, Pretrial Procedures More Effectively Han-
dled, 65 F.R.D. 475 (1974).
143 Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 451, 463 (1970) ("Cases where counsel
have anticipated trials lasting weeks or even months have been collapsed into satisfac-
tory trials of less than six to twelve court days.").
44 Id. at 463-65 ("The purpose of the pretrial procedure is to endeavor to
avoid wasting time at trial in hearing proof on substantive matter which ought not
reasonably be controverted or matter which opposing counsel, while not admitting, con-
cedes he will not controvert at trial.") (emphasis in original).
145
 This procedure was apparently employed in In re United States Financial
Sec. Litigation. See Brief for Appellant Union Bank at 17, In re United States Financial
Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (1977).
i 9" The suggestions appearing in this article are not intended as a comprehen-
sive imalysis of procedural tactics for dealing with complex cases. Au excellent and
exhaustive discussion of the topic appears in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX IL/LIGATION
(West Publishing Co., 1977), and its forerunner, The Handbook of Recommended Proce-
dures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, published in 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960). The Manual
takes the position that "there are no inherently protracted cases, only cases which are
unnecessarily protracted by inefficient procedures and management." MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, p. ii.
'" See Note, jury Trials in Protracted Commercial Litigation, 10 U. CONN. L. REV.
775, 785 & on.37-38 (1978). discussing the methods employed by Judge Newman in
S.C.M. Corp. v. Xerox Corp., Civil No. 15,807 (D. Conn. filed July 31, 1973). The
author takes the view that "[wlhilc these measures may aid jurors to some degree, the
jury is still at a disadvantage compared to a judge." But see Kalven, The. Dignity of the
Civil Jury, 50 U. VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964). Professor Kalven argues that on the basis of
statistical evidence, there is little difference between the abilities of judges and juries to
decide difficult. cases. Id. at 1064-66.
' 44 This procedure was employed in S.C.M. Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 10,
15 (D. Conn. 1977) (pre-trial ruling). For a complete description of the methods
employed to assist the jurors in S.C.M, see Note, fury Trials in Protracted Commercial
Litigation, 10 U. CONN. L. REV. 775, 785 (1978).
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tailed instructions on the applicable law, especially when given before, as well
as after the presentation of the evidence, may also prove helpful in simplify-
ing the jury's task. A well drafted, detailed outline of the logical steps to be
followed in deciding the case should do much to direct the jury's analysis
along the appropriate path. This benefit could he enhanced, moreover, by
permitting the jury to have access to the court's written instructions during its
tenure in the jury room."" Finally, special interrogatories pertaining to the
facts relevant to the issue of ultimate liability could be propounded to the.jury
pursuant to rule 49(a) or (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a final
check on the rationality of the jury's verdict.''" in this manner, the trial
judge could conveniently scrutinize the jury's verdict for any indications of
arbitrariness.
Admittedly, employment of the procedural methods suggested in the
preceding paragraphs will entail the expenditure of considerable judicial
energy, but if means are available to the courts to reduce complex cases to an
intelligible level, then the seventh amendment commands that they be
employed in preference to denying or curtailing the jury right. Effective utili-
zation of pre-trial procedure will avoid not only the constitutional difficulties
inherent in the denial of jury trial in complex civil cases, but will afford sig-
nificant practical benefits as well. The early clarification of claims, for example,
is likely to encourage the responsible settlement of law suits, 151 thereby
eliminating the need for a trial of any kind. In sum, it seems practical and
sensible to pursue existing alternatives, especially where those alternatives may
afford a substantially shortened, and more easily managed trial.
"4" Access to judges' instructions is not yet a widely permitted practice. But see
Stra us & Buchanan, jury Confusion; A Threat to Justice, 59 jun. 478. 483 (1976), The
authors found that many jurors do not understand judges' oral instructions. There
would thus scent to be a special ['Wed to propound written i nstructions to he jUITITS in
complex civil cases.
' 5 '' Rule 49(a) provides in relevant part:
court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the firm
Of a special written finding upon each issue of fact or it. may use such
other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings
thereon as it deems most appropriate.
Rule 49(h) provides in pertinent part:
The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate fOrms for a
general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or store issues of fact the
decision of which is necessary to a verdict..... When the answers are con-
sistent with each other, but one or mote is inconsistent with the general
verdict, judgment may he entered pursuant to Rule 58 in accordance with
the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court m2ty return
the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a
new trial. When the answers arc inconsistent with each other and one or
more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall not be
entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its
an sw ers and verdict or shall order it new trial.
15 ' Pollack. Pretrial Conferences, 50 EU). at 462.
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CONCLUSION
Neither the seventh amendment nor the due process clause provides
constitutional justification for striking demands for jury trial in complex civil
cases presenting legal claims. Both historical practice and modern inter-
pretations of the seventh amendment defy the contention that jury compe-
tence is generally relevant to the adequacy of the legal remedy, insofar as its
inadequacy is a prerequisite to obtaining equitable relief. 152
 Moreover, the
availability of judgment non obstante verdiclo affords adequate protection
against the due process violations that would otherwise result from clearly
arbitrary jury verdicts. Even aside from these constitutional difficulties, the
creation of a complexity exception to the seventh amendment would engen-
der a host. of practical problems for courts and litigants alike. The simpler,
more reasonable approach to the problem of complex civil litigation is to de-
velop and utilize effective procedural methods for reducing the "monster
case" to a manageable size.
CONSTANCE S. HurrNER
152
 But see, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
	
U.S.
	
99 S. Ct. 645 (1979),
suggesting that the Court may he moving toward a functional approach to determine
the right to jury trial. If the Court were to ultimately embrace a test that conditioned
the right to jury trial upon its relative functional desirability, jury competence would
presumably become relevant to the resolution of the seventh amendment question. See
generally Kane, Civil Jury Trial: The Case For lleriyoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.j. 1
(1978). Btii see Paridane Hosiery, supra (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
